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ARTICLES
RESISTING ITS OWN OBSOLESCENCE-HOW THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD IS
QUESTIONING THE EXISTING LAW OF
NEUTRALITY AGREEMENTS
CHARLES I. COHEN*
JOSEPH E. SANTUCCI, JR
JONATHAN C. FRITrS
INTRODUCTION
Neutrality and card check recognition agreements have
existed in various forms for decades, but there is surprisingly lit-
tle law under the National Labor Relations Act' ("NLRA" or
"Act") examining these types of agreements. The law that does
exist generally holds that neutrality and card check agreements
are lawful and enforceable. Federal courts hold that, while
union representation issues are within the primary jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board"), neu-
trality and card check agreements are enforceable in federal
court as long as they are consistent with federal labor law. The
NLRB, in turn, has been willing to defer to private agreements
that resolve union representation matters, rather than deciding
the representation question through a Board-supervised secret
ballot election.2
Existing law may soon change, however, once decisions issue
in a series of cases now pending before the NLRB. At a mini-
mum, existing law will be closely examined by the Board. The
* The authors are practicing labor lawyers in the Washington, D.C. office
of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP. Mr. Cohen served as a Member of the
National Labor Relations Board from 1994 to 1996. The authors have repre-
sented employers in many industries in matters involving neutrality and card
check agreements.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 150-69 (2000).
2. This willingness by the Board to defer to neutrality and card check
recognition agreements has resulted in a diminishment of the Board's role in
union representation issues. See Charles I. Cohen, Neutrality Agreements: Will the
NLRB Sanction Its Own Obsolescence? 16 LAB. LAw. 201 (2000).
521
522 NOTIRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20
Board appointed by President Bush has said the time has come
to take a "critical look" at the law regarding neutrality agree-
ments.3 Whether that "critical look" will result in a fundamental
change in the law remains to be seen, but some change-or at
least significant clarification-seems likely.
This Article reviews the extant law concerning neutrality and
card check agreements, and then discusses the various issues that
are now ripe for decision by the NLRB. These issues range from
the fundamental policy question of whether the Board should
enforce an employer's agreement to recognize a union without
an NLRB-supervised secret ballot election, to questions concern-
ing whether certain terms that may be included in a neutrality
agreement violate the Act even if the agreement as a whole does
not. The Board's answers to these questions will have a profound
impact on labor-management relations in many industries where
neutrality agreements have become a ubiquitous feature in the
modern landscape of collective bargaining.
I. THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF
NEUTRAiT.rry AGREEMENTS
Although neutrality agreements are now a common and sig-
nificant topic at the bargaining table, that was not the case as
recently as a decade ago. Neutrality agreements first began to
appear in the automobile, rubber, and steel industries (among
others) in the 1970s. But it was not until the 1990s that neutrality
agreements became the focal point of discussion in numerous
negotiations. Neutrality agreements have now become so com-
mon that unions in many industries have virtually abandoned the
NLRB's secret ballot election procedure, reluctantly using that
procedure only as the method of last resort.
Neutrality agreements have become an essential organizing
tool for the labor movement because they often call for much
more than simple neutrality and recognition based on a majority
(or occasionally a super-majority) showing of authorization
cards. Modern neutrality agreements often contain a variety of
provisions that affirmatively assist a union in its organizing cam-
paign and expedite the bargaining process once recognition has
been obtained. For example, in addition to an agreement to rec-
ognize the union based on a card check and a commitment to
maintain a neutral position with respect to the union's organiz-
ing campaign, a neutrality agreement may contain the following
additional provisions that afford the union a distinct advantage:
3. Dana/Metaldyne Corp., 341 NLRB No. 150, slip op. at 1-2 Uune 7,
2004).
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* A complete "gag order" against any employer communica-
tions with employees about the subject of unionization.
" An agreement to meet promptly with the union concern-
ing the scope and composition of the bargaining unit to
be organized, and to resolve any disputes concerning
these issues through an expedited arbitration process.
* An agreement to provide the union with an early list of
names and contact information for employees in the
agreed-upon bargaining unit.
* An agreement granting the union access to the employer's
facilities for the purpose of distributing information and
meeting with employees.
* An agreement to submit unresolved issues to interest arbi-
tration if agreement on a first contract is not quickly
reached. Or, an agreement to apply an existing contract
to the new bargaining unit once it has been organized.
* An agreement to extend coverage of the neutrality agree-
ment to subsidiaries, affiliates, and successors of the signa-
tory company.
Provisions such as these significantly increase the chances that an
organizing drive will be successful. As dissenting Board Members
Liebman and Walsh noted in Dana Corporation/Metaldyne Cor-
poration, "American labor unions have had increasing success in
organizing employees by winning voluntary recognition from
employers."4 Employers, in turn, agree to provisions such as
these usually as the result of pressure from a corporate cam-
paign, from fear of the union's influence in the regulatory arena,
or simply through the leverage applied in collective bargaining
concerning employees who are already represented by the
union.
II. EXISTING LAW CONCERNING NEUTRALITY AND CARD
CHECK AGREEMENTS
A. Federal Court Enforcement
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that, while a Board-
supervised secret ballot election is the "most commonly traveled"
and "preferred" route for a union to obtain recognition, it is not
the only way in which a union may be recognized.5 Recognition
may be obtained by presenting the employer with authorization
cards signed by a majority of the employees to be represented.6
4. Id. at 2.
5. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596 (1969).
6. Id. at 597.
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The employer is not required, however, to accept authorization
cards as proof of a union's majority status, and may insist on a
secret ballot election conducted by the NLRB.7 A neutrality/
card check agreement amounts to a waiver by the employer of its
right to insist on an NLRB election as the basis for union
recognition.
Federal courts generally hold that neutrality and card check
agreements are enforceable under Section 301 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act ("Section 301").8 For instance, the
United. States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Marriott
Corporation held that a neutrality and card check agreement was
enforceable under Section 301 because it did not require the
court to decide representational issues that are within the
NLRB's primary jurisdiction:
We have recognized repeatedly that courts must refuse to
exercise jurisdiction over claims involving representational
issues; such issues are more appropriately resolved by the
NLRB .... However, we have also held that while the
courts may not resolve representational issues, the parties
may resolve these issues contractually. 9
Although recognizing that an agreement would not be enforcea-
ble if it were contrary to federal labor policy, the Ninth Circuit in
Marriott held that the neutrality and card check provisions of the
agreement at issue in that case were enforceable in federal court
because they were consistent with federal labor law.) ° The Ninth
Circuit also held, however, that a federal court would not have
jurisdiction to imply a requirement to provide the union with
access to the employer's facilities or a list of employees' names,
addresses, and phone numbers unless the parties specifically
agreed to such a requirement."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reached the same conclusion with respect to the enforceability of
a neutrality agreement in JP. Morgan Hotel The Second Circuit
held that the NLRB's jurisdiction over representational issues is
primary, but not exclusive, and that Section 301 "grants courts
7. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 304-05
(1974).
8. See UAW v. Dana Corp., 278 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2002); Hotel & Rest.
Employees Union Local 217 v.J.P. Morgan Hotel, 996 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1993);
Hotel Employees, Rest. Employees Union, Local 2 v. Marriott Corp., 961 F.2d
1464 (9th Cir. 1992).
9. Marriott Corp., 961 F.2d at 1468 (emphasis in original).
10. Id. at 1468, 1470.
11. Id. at 1469.
THE NLRB AND NEUTRAITY AGREEMENTS
concurrent jurisdiction over representation issues."12 This con-
clusion was bolstered, in the court's view, because the neutrality
agreement at issue in JP. Morgan contained an arbitration provi-
sion, so that the "crucial initial representation decision is made
by the arbitrator, as the parties agreed, and the court is
presented with the much more narrow and common issue of
interpreting a contract arbitration clause, over which its power of
review is extremely limited."1 In addition, the court rejected the
argument that the neutrality agreement at issue was not enforce-
able under Section 301 because the union did not have majority
support at the time it was negotiated. The court noted that Sec-
tion 301 jurisdiction applies to a wide range of labor contracts,
and not just a traditional collective bargaining agreement which
may be negotiated only if the union has achieved representative
status. 
14
B. Existing NLRB Precedent Regarding Neutrality or Card
Check Agreements
The seminal Board case concerning card check recognition
agreements is Kroger Company.1 5 The Kroger case involved a so-
called "after acquired stores" clause in two collective bargaining
agreements. The clauses were interpreted to require the
employer to recognize the union and apply the existing agree-
ments to stores added to the Houston Division of the Kroger
Company. The Board found that these clauses amounted to a
waiver of the employer's right to insist on a Board election as the
basis for union recognition. 6 Ironically, although there was no
explicit requirement that the union demonstrate majority sup-
port before seeking recognition pursuant to the after-acquired
stores clauses, the Board inferred a card check requirement in
order to preserve the validity of the clauses. Implicitly holding
that the clauses were a mandatory subject of bargaining, the
Board concluded that the employer violated Section 8(a) (5) of
the Act by refusing to recognize the union based on a card
check. Also significant was the Board's holding that an employer
may lawfully enter into a card check recognition agreement with
a union before the union begins an organizing campaign. 7
12. JP. Morgan Hotel, 996 F.2d at 565.
13. Id. at 567-68 (emphasis in original).
14. Id. at 566.
15. Kroger Co., 219 NLRB 388 (1975).
16. Id. at 389.
17. Id.
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Subsequently, in Mine Workers (Lone Star Steel),"8 the Board
held that a union did not violate Section 8(b) (3) of the Act by
striking in support of its demand to include an "application of
contract" clause in the parties' collective bargaining agreement.
That clause would have ensured that the existing agreement
would be applied to any facility owned or acquired by the
employer, following recognition by the employer or Board certi-
fication. The Board held that the proposed application of con-
tract clause, like the after-acquired stores clause in Kroger,
constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining.' 9 Therefore, the
union did not violate Section 8(b) (3) by striking in support of it.
The Tenth Circuit, however, rejected this conclusion on the
employer's petition for review, holding that the application of
contract clause "is much broader than necessary to accomplish
the legitimate Union goal of protecting employees against a shift
of production to another mine to evade standards and wages at
the [bargaining unit] mine."2"
The Board essentially reaffirmed its holding in Lone Star Steel
twenty years later, in Pall Biomedical Products Corporation.21 At
issue in Pall Biomedical was a clause that required the employer to
recognize the union at its facility in Port Washington, New York,
"in the event that it employs one (1) or more employees per-
forming bargaining unit work" at that facility.2 2 The clause did
not, however, require that the existing collective bargaining
agreement be applied automatically upon recognition, as did the
clauses at issue in Kroger and Lone Star Steel. Like a typical neutral-
ity agreement, the clause provided only that the employer and
union would "meet to discuss the terms and conditions of
employment for such employees" following recognition.23 The
Board nonetheless concluded that the clause was a mandatory
subject of bargaining, reasoning that the union "would be in a
position to protect the interests of the existing unit employees by
achieving recognition . .. and negotiating terms and conditions
of employment similar to those enjoyed" by the existing bargain-
ing unit employees.24 Member Hurtgen dissented, arguing that
the clause was not a mandatory subject of bargaining because it
did not remove the economic incentive to transfer work to the
Port Washington facility by requiring application of the existing
18. Mine Workers (Lone Star Steel), 231 NLRB 573 (1977).
19. Id. at 576.
20. Lone Star Steel Co. v. NLRB, 639 F.2d 545, 558 (10th Cir. 1980).
21. Pall Biomedical Prods. Corp., 331 NLRB 1674 (2000).
22. Id. at 1674.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1677.
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25contract to that facility; the clause only mandated recognition.
The D.C. Circuit agreed with Member Hurtgen's position and
reversed the Board, holding that the clause was a non-mandatory
subject of bargaining because it was not a "direct frontal attack"
on the problem of preventing the transfer of bargaining unit
work to the Port Washington facility.
26
Pall Biomedical portended the debate over whether a typical
neutrality agreement constitutes a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing. Like the clause at issue in Pall Biomedical, a typical neutrality
agreement does not require automatic application of an existing
collective bargaining agreement when the union is recognized.
Instead, a neutrality agreement normally calls for the parties to
negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement following recog-
nition of the union. Therefore, according to the D.C. Circuit's
analysis in Pall Biomedical, a typical neutrality agreement would
not constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining because it
would not necessarily protect the interests of an existing bargain-
ing unit if the contract negotiated at a newly organized facility
does not provide the same level of wages and benefits as the con-
tract for the existing bargaining unit. Accordingly, a union could
not strike at an existing facility in support of a demand for a neu-
trality agreement covering other facilities, nor could a union
enforce a neutrality agreement through the filing of a charge
under Section 8(a) (5) of the Act,2 7 because the agreement
would not constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining under
the D.C. Circuit's decision in Pall Biomedical.
In the years following its decision in Pall Biomedical, the
Board has not decided whether a neutrality agreement consti-
tutes a mandatory subject of bargaining. The Board has, how-
ever, demonstrated a willingness to cede its primary jurisdiction
over representation matters when the parties have agreed to a
neutrality or card check recognition agreement. For instance, in
Central Parking System,2" the employer filed an election petition in
response to the union's demand for recognition pursuant to a
contract provision which the union asserted was an "after
acquired" clause. The Board dismissed the employer's petition,
holding that the union's demand for recognition based on the
alleged "after-acquired" clause did not entitle the employer to an
election under Section 9(c)(1)(B) of the Act. 29 The Board
deferred to arbitration the issue of whether the contract provi-
25. Id. at 1681.
26. Pall Corp. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 116, 122 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (2000).
28. Central Parking Sys., Inc., 335 NLRB 390 (2001).
29. Id. at 390.
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sion in question constituted an "after acquired" clause, which
would require the employer to recognize the union based on a
showing of majority support.
30
Similarly, in Verizon Information Systems,3 1 the Board dis-
missed a union's election petition when the union had already
invoked the recognition procedure established under a neutral-
ity and card check agreement. The parties deadlocked about the
scope of the bargaining unit under the neutrality/card check
agreement and submitted the unit scope issue to arbitration.
Before the case was heard by the arbitrator, the union filed an
election petition with the Board. The Board found that the neu-
trality/card check agreement barred the petition, explaining
that this holding was "expressly premised on the fact that the
Petitioner invoked the provisions of the Agreement in seeking to
organize the Employer's employees." '32 The Board noted that it
would not have reached the same conclusion if the union had
filed the petition initially, without invoking the agreement. Ulti-
mately, the Board held that the issue was "really one of estoppel"
and concluded that "the policies of the Act can best be effectu-
ated by holding the Petitioner to its bargain."3
In Raley's,34 the Board again considered the effect of an
"after acquired" clause in a collective bargaining agreement.
The Board found that the clause in this case applied to preexist-
ing stores as well as new stores, and held that the clause clearly
and unmistakably waived the employer's right to determine the
union's majority status through a Board election. 35 Again assum-
ing that the "after acquired" clause was a mandatory subject of
bargaining, the Board held that the employer would have vio-
lated Section 8(a) (5) of the Act by refusing to recognize the
union if the union had demonstrated majority support through
authorization cards.36
Most recently, in Hotel Del Coronado,7 the Board rejected a
successor employer's claim that a Board-conducted election was
tainted by a neutrality agreement entered into by the predeces-
30. Id. at 391.
31. Verizon Info. Sys., 335 NLRB 558 (2001).
32. Id. at 560.
33. Id.
34. Raley's, 336 NLRB 374 (2001).
35. Id. at 376-77.
36. Id. at 378. The Board remanded the case for a factual determination
as to whether the union did, in fact, demonstrate majority support through
authorization cards. Id.
37. KSL DC Mgmt., LLC (Hotel Del Coronado), 345 NLRB No. 24, slip
op. (Aug. 26, 2005).
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sor employer and the union. The election was held, and the
union was certified, less than two months before the successor
purchased the property from the predecessor employer. The
Board found that any of the issues raised by the successor could
have been raised by the predecessor employer.3 8 Chairman Bat-
tista found it unnecessary to decide the issue of whether card
check recognition based on a neutrality agreement would be
binding on a successor employer.
39
III. WHERE WILL THE BOARD GO FROM HERE?
The NLRB may soon reverse its trend of deferring to neu-
trality and card check agreements in an effort to defend its pri-
mary jurisdiction over representation matters and to emphasize
the value of the Board's secret ballot election process. Two
pending cases provide a strong indication that the current Board
is inclined to reconsider Kroger and the broader policy question
of whether an employer's waiver of the right to a Board-super-
vised secret ballot election should be enforced. Those two cases
are Dana Corporation/Metaldyne Corporation4 ° and Shaw's Supermar-
kets," both of which are discussed below. In addition, the Board
may consider the validity of certain key provisions that may be
included in a neutrality agreement upon review of another Dana
Corporation case (Dana Corp. or Dana 11)42 and in Heartland Indus-
trial Partners.4" These cases, and their implications at the bargain-
ing table, also are discussed below.
A. Dana/Metaldyne: A Narrow Issue with Broad Implications
In Dana Corporation and Metaldyne Corporation (two cases that
were consolidated on review and hereinafter referred to as
"Dana/Metaldyne Corp."), the Board indicated that it may not treat
recognition pursuant to a neutrality agreement as the equivalent
of a secret ballot election. Both cases involved decertification
petitions filed soon after recognition was granted pursuant to a
neutrality agreement. In both cases, the petitions were dismissed
by the Regional Director based on the Board's recognition bar
38. Id. at 1-2.
39. Id. at 2 n.6.
40. Dana/Metaldyne Corp., 341 NLRB No. 150, slip op. (June 7, 2004).
41. Shaw's Supermarkets, 343 NLRB No. 105, slip op. (Dec. 8, 2004).
42. Dana Corp., JD-24-05 (NLRB Div. of Judges Apr. 8, 2005).
43. Heartland Indus. Partners, JD(NY)-23-05 (NLRB Div. of Judges June
16, 2005).
2006]
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doctrine, which provides that voluntary recognition of a union
will bar an election petition for "a reasonable period of time.""
The Board granted the employers' request for review, not-
ing that in both cases the card check agreement was entered into
before the union obtained authorization cards from the employ-
ees it sought to organize. In its order granting review, the Board
distinguished existing precedent on the grounds that it "is based
upon a union's obtaining signed authorization cards from a
majority of the unit employees before entering into the agree-
ment with an employer."45 The Board was clear to express the
limits of the issue under review, however, stating that "no party
here challenges the legality of voluntary recognition."46 The
only issue under review is "the extent to which, if any, a voluntary
recognition should be given election 'bar quality' "-i.e., whether
voluntary recognition should bar an election petition for some
period of time.47 Despite this narrow framing of the issue, the
Board majority concluded its order granting review with what
seems to be a more sweeping pronouncement about recognition
agreements:
In sum, we believe that the increased usage of recogni-
tion agreements, the varying contexts in which a recogni-
tion agreement can be reached, the superiority of Board
supervised secret-ballot elections, and the importance of
Section 7 rights of employees, are all factors which warrant
a critical look at the issues raised herein. At this point, the
only difference between our colleagues and ourselves is
that we believe the time is appropriate to take that critical
look and they do not.4 8
Perhaps because of this seemingly broad pronouncement,
Dana/Metaldyne Corp. has been widely misconstrued as calling for
a referendum on the legality or enforceability of neutrality and
card check agreements in general. The potential impact of this
case is not nearly that great. A refusal to accord "bar quality" to
recognition granted pursuant to a neutrality/card check agree-
ment would certainly be a significant change in the law-if that is
what the Board ultimately decides-but such a ruling would not
preclude an employer from granting recognition in the first
place. The validity of the recognition would be called into ques-
44. Dana/Metaldyne Corp., 341 NLRB No. 150, slip op. at 1 (citing Seattle




48. Id. at 1-2.
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tion only if employees or a rival union file an election petition in
the months immediately following recognition and before agree-
ment on a first contract is reached.49 Moreover, the potential
impact of Dana/Metaldyne Corp. would be even further limited if
the Board adopts the suggestion, advanced by the Petitioners in
an alternative argument and by the General Counsel as amicus
curiae, that any exception to the recognition bar should be con-
fined to a thirty or forty-five day period following recognition-
and perhaps even then only if the petition is supported by a
majority (rather than the normal thirty percent) of bargaining
unit employees. Thus, while Dana/Metaldyne Corp. has attracted a
great deal of attention and criticism, its impact on the adminis-
tration of neutrality and card check agreements is likely to be
quite limited.
B. Shaw's Supermarkets: The End of the Kroger Era?
Shaw's Supermarkets, meanwhile, has not attracted the same
level of attention as Dana/Metaldyne Corp. (measured at least in
terms of amicus curiae briefs), but its impact is potentially much
greater. The issue in Shaw's Supermarkets is whether an
employer's election petition should be dismissed based on an
"after acquired" clause in the parties' collective bargaining agree-
ment. This is essentially the same issue that was presented in Cen-
tral Parking System, as the Board acknowledged. The Board in
Shaw's Supermarkets explained that its decision in Central Parking
System was "contrary to the general rule that the Board does not
defer representation case issues to arbitration."5 Accordingly,
the Board warned of the possibility that it will "abide by the gen-
eral rule rather than Central Parking."'
In granting review, the Board identified two issues raised by
the employer's petition: (1) whether the employer had clearly
and unmistakably waived the right to a Board election; and (2) if
so, whether public policy considerations outweigh the employer's
private agreement not to have an election.52 With respect to the
second issue, the Board identified the policy concerns motivating
its decision to grant review:
49. Once agreement on a first contract is reached, the Board's contract
bar doctrine would preclude an election for the duration of the contract, to the
extent it does not exceed three years. See, e.g., General Cable Corp., 139 NLRB
1123 (1962).
50. Shaw's Supermarkets, 343 NLRB No. 105, slip op. at 2 (Dec. 8, 2004).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1.
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It is clear that the Board's election machinery is the pre-
ferred way to resolve the question of whether employees
desire union representation. That method, as compared
to a card-check, offers a secret ballot choice under the
watchful supervision of a Board agent. We recognize that,
under current law, an employer can voluntarily recognize a
union based on a card-majority, and that such recognition
can operate to preclude employee resort to election
machinery for a reasonable period of time. However, in
Dana Corporation and Metaldyne Corporation, we have
granted review to consider inter alia, that issue. We can do
no less here.
53
The Board remanded the case to the Regional Director to con-
duct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the employer
in this case did, in fact, waive its right to a Board election
through the after-acquired stores clause.
On remand, the Regional Director concluded that the
employer did in fact waive its right to a Board election, based on
extant law involving after-acquired stores clauses (i.e., Kroger and
Central Parking System). 54 Citing Kroger, the Regional Director
noted that "[f] or the last 30 years, the Board has found that an
employer waives its right to a Board election by agreeing to such
an additional stores clause."55 But even if the employer had not
waived its right to a Board election, the Regional Director found
that the employer was estopped from filing an election petition
under the Board's decision in Verizon Information Systems. Accord-
ingly, the Regional Director dismissed the employer's election
petition. The employer requested review of the Regional Direc-
tor's decision on remand, which the Board granted on March 15,
2006.
The public policy issue that is now framed for consideration
by the Board in Shaw's Supermarkets has broad implications for all
forms of neutrality and card check agreements, not just after-
acquired stores clauses. The Board has set the stage for reconsid-
ering whether a voluntary recognition agreement should pre-
clude a Board-supervised secret ballot election. Thus, Shaw's
Supermarkets provides further indication of how the Board is likely
to rule in Dana/Metaldyne Corp.
53. Id. at 2 (footnotes omitted).
54. Shaw's Supermarkets, 1-RM-1267 (NLRB Reg'l Dir., 1st Region Mar.
22, 2005). The Regional Director did not consider the public policy issue iden-
tified by the Board to be within the scope of the remand.
55. Id. at 9.
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It seems likely that the Board will hold that a neutrality or
card check agreement which is entered into by the employer and
union before the organizing campaign begins will not operate as
a waiver of the employees' right to seek a Board election. Moreo-
ver, the Board in Shaw's Supermarkets seems inclined to change
the law regarding the effectiveness of a waiver of an employer's
right to insist on a Board election as the method for determining
a union's majority support. The Board, at a minimum, was skep-
tical of the proposition that an after-acquired stores clause, on its
face, "clearly and unmistakably" waives the employer's right to
insist on a Board election.56 But the policy concerns expressed
in Shaw's Supermarkets seem to extend beyond mere skepticism,
and reflect a more fundamental concern about the widespread
use of card check recognition agreements and the consequent
decline in use of the Board's secret ballot election process.
C. Dana Corp.: How Far Can the Parties Go in a
Neutrality Agreement?
The issue in a recent case again involving the Dana Corpora-
tion (Dana Corp. orDana 1/)57 is whether or not a neutrality agree-
ment entered into between the Dana Corporation and the
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America ("UAW") was unlawful because, in addition
to establishing a procedure governing the recognition process, it
made substantive agreements on terms and conditions of
employment. The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") dismissed
the complaint on procedural grounds, because the complaint
failed to allege that the company had unlawfully recognized the
union.58 However, the ALJ still went on to address the merits of
the case, "in the event that the Board might find that useful."5
The agreement at issue included provisions typically found
in a neutrality agreement, such as an agreement by Dana to
adopt a position of neutrality regarding the UAW's efforts to
organize employees at a covered facility, and an agreement to
provide the UAW with access to employees at its facilities and,
upon request, a list of employees' home addresses. The agree-
ment also established an expedited process for negotiating a first
contract at a newly organized facility, a process that would
culminate in interest arbitration if the parties were unable to
reach agreement. In addition to these fairly typical provisions,
56. Shaw's Supermarkets, 343 NLRB No. 105, slip op. at 1 (Dec. 8, 2005).
57. JD-24-05 (NLRB Div. of Judges Apr. 8, 2005).
58. Id. at 6.
59. Id.
2006]
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the agreement included a no-strike/no-lockout commitment that
would be triggered when the UAW requested a list of employees
at a covered facility. The parties further agreed that any collec-
tive bargaining agreement negotiated would have a duration of
at least four years, and they agreed that any agreement negoti-
ated must include the following conditions in order for the facil-
ity "to have a reasonable chance to succeed and grow":
* Healthcare costs that reflect the competitive reality of the
supplier industry and product(s) involved;
" Minimum classifications;
" Team-based approaches;
" The importance of attendance to productivity and quality;
" Dana's idea program (two ideas per person per month
and eighty percent implementation);
* Continuous improvement;
* Flexible compensation; and,
• Mandatory overtime when necessary (after qualified vol-
unteers) to support the customer. 60
It thus seems that the agreement in Dana Corp. represents a
new generation of neutrality/card check agreements. Instead of
the more typical variety designed to ease the union's ability to
obtain recognition and a first contract, this one provided assur-
ances that the employer could be competitive under the collec-
tive bargaining agreement ultimately negotiated. But
agreements such as these implicate other legal issues.
The Board in Majestic Weaving Company6 ' held that an
employer unlawfully assisted a union, in violation of Section
8(a) (2) of the Act, when it negotiated a collective bargaining
agreement that was contingent on the union achieving majority
support. The Board noted the Supreme Court's holding in Bern-
hard-Altmann6 2 that there "could be no clearer abridgment" of
employees' Section 7 rights than to recognize a union as the bar-
gaining agent of employees who have not yet selected the union
as their representative.6" Accordingly, the Board held that the
employer in Majestic Weaving violated Section 8(a) (2) by negoti-
ating a contract with a union that did not have majority support
among the employees who would be covered by the contract.64
60. Id. at 7.
61. Majestic Weaving Co., 147 NLRB 859 (1964), enf denied, 355 F.2d 854
(2d Cir. 1966).
62. Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB (Bernhard-Alitmann
Texas Corp.), 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
63. Majestic Weaving, 147 NLRB at 860.
64. Id. at 862.
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In dismissing allegations that the agreement in Dana Corp.
violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (2) and Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act, the ALJ found no evidence that Dana had, in actuality, rec-
ognized the UAW as the representative of the employees in ques-
tion. To the contrary, the ALJ found that the agreement
"explicitly states that recognition has not been granted."65 The
ALJ also rejected the allegation that the UAW and Dana "went
beyond discussing tentative contract proposals in the letter of
agreement and made substantive agreements on the terms and
conditions of employment of employees."66 The ALJ found that
the letter agreement did not constitute a collective bargaining
agreement "from which recognition can be inferred" because it
did not deal with "significant matters such as wages, pensions,
grievances and arbitration, vacations, union security, etc. "67
Indeed, the ALJ noted that the complaint described the letter
agreement as setting forth terms and conditions of employment
"to be negotiated in a collective bargaining agreement."68 The
ALJ also found that the no-strike commitment waived only the
UAW's right to call a strike; "the employees' Section 7 right to
concertedly strike remains intact."69
Based on these findings, the ALJ concluded that the letter
agreement was a "far cry" from the sort of pre-hire collective bar-
gaining agreement which the Board found to be unlawful in
Majestic Weaving.v The ALJ concluded that Majestic Weaving was
not controlling for two reasons. First, in Majestic Weaving, the
employer had recognized the union "apart from negotiating the
contract"-an element the ALJ found was not present in this
case. 71 Second, the ALJ found that the collective bargaining
agreement in Majestic Weaving was "complete and whole,"
whereas the agreement at issue in Dana II did not establish many
significant terms and conditions of employment.
72
As an alternative basis for dismissing the complaint, the ALJ
found that Kroger sanctioned the parties' negotiation of limited
terms and conditions of employment to be applied at newly
organized facilities. Since the Board in Kroger found that an
after-acquired stores clause was lawful even though it required
the application of the entire existing collective bargaining agree-
65. Dana Corp., JD-24-05, at 7 (NLRB Div. of Judges Apr. 8, 2005).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 8.
68. Id. at 7-8.
69. Id. at 7.
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ment upon a showing of majority support, the ALJ reasoned that
it must be lawful to require application of only limited portions
of an existing agreement at a newly organized facility:
It seems to me that if Dana and the UAW are free to extend
their existing agreements to cover the (new facilities']
employees they should be free to bargain for less than a
full extension so as to allow greater employee participation
in the terms and conditions of employment at the new
facilities.
73
Exceptions have been filed to the ALJ's decision in Dana II,
and thus a wide range of issues are now before the Board for
resolution. The main issue presented is the continuing validity
of Majestic Weaving and its application in the context of a neutral-
ity agreement. Furthermore, the Board must reconcile the ten-
sion between Majestic Weaving and Kroger. Whereas Majestic
Weaving squarely holds that a collective bargaining agreement
negotiated before the union has majority status is unlawful even
if it is conditioned on the union subsequently achieving majority
status, 7 4 Kroger expressly sanctions a clause that applies an
existing collective bargaining agreement to a new group of
employees as long as the union demonstrates majority support.
Kroger may be distinguished on the grounds that an after-
acquired stores clause preserves the stability of an established col-
lective bargaining relationship, and protects the interests of
existing bargaining unit employees by discouraging the transfer
of work from a covered facility to a non-covered facility. But,
given the current Board's stated desire to reconsider Kroger, the
likely outcome seems to be that Majestic Weaving will be reaf-
firmed-perhaps at the expense of Kroger and its progeny.
D. Heartland Industrial Partners: Can the Parties Impose a
Neutrality Agreement on Subsidiaries or
Affiliated Companies?
Also before the Board is the question of whether parties to a
neutrality agreement may lawfully agree to impose that agree-
ment on subsidiaries or corporate affiliates of the signatory com-
pany. In Heartland Industrial Partners, LLC,75 an Administrative
Law Judge held that such a provision in a neutrality agreement
did not violate Section 8(e) of the Act. Section 8(e) generally
prohibits an employer and a union from entering into an agree-
ment in which the employer agrees to "cease doing business with
73. Id. at 9.
74. Majestic Weaving, 147 NLRB 859, 860 (1964).
75. JD(NY)-23-05 (NLRB Div. of Judges June 16, 2005).
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any other person."76 Here, there was an agreement between
Heartland and the United Steelworkers of America ("Steelwork-
ers") which provided that Heartland would "cause" any Covered
Business Entity ("CBE") to execute a neutrality agreement with
the Steelworkers within ten days of notification of the Steelwork-
ers' intent to organize any of the CBE's facilities. It was alleged
that this provision violated Section 8(e) of the Act because it
required Heartland to "cease doing business" with any company
that refused to enter into a neutrality agreement with the
Steelworkers.
The ALJ dismissed the Section 8(e) allegation on the
grounds that a single event transaction involving the purchase or
sale of a business does not constitute "doing business" within the
meaning of Section 8(e).7 7 This conclusion was based on a line
of cases which holds that a successorship clause which requires
an employer to condition the sale of its business on the pur-
chaser's assumption of the existing collective bargaining agree-
ment does not violate Section 8(e).78 As the Board held in
Cascade Employers Association, "the sale or transfer of an enterprise
has been viewed not as a business transaction but as a substitu-
tion of one entity for the other while the conduct of business
continues without interruption."79 Additionally, the ALJ found
that the agreement at issue in Heartland Industries did not require
a cessation of business with "any other person" within the mean-
ing of Section 8(e) because the agreement only applied to busi-
ness entities controlled by Heartland.8 0 Thus, the ALJ noted that
"if the acquired entity is controlled by Heartland ... then the
neutrality agreement would simply be an agreement, by Heart-
land, to cease doing business with itself."'
The ALJ's decision in Heartland is currently before the
Board on exceptions filed by the General Counsel and the
Charging Parties. It is possible that the Board will adopt the
76. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (2004).
77. Heartland, JD(NY)-23-05, at 10, 14.
78. Id. at 9 (citing Mine Workers (Lone Star Steel), 231 NLRB 573
(1977), enfd, 639 F.2d 545, 550 n.12 (10th Cir. 1980); Teamsters Local 814
(Bader Bros. Warehouses, Inc.), 225 NLRB 609 n.1 (1976); Cascade Employers
Ass'n, 221 NLRB 751 (1975)).
79. See Heartland, JD(NY)-23-05, at 9 (quoting Cascade Employers Ass'n,
221 NRLB 751, 752 (1975)).
80. The agreement defined a Covered Business Entity as one in which
Heartland: "Directly or indirectly (i) owns more than 50% of the common
stock; (ii) controls more than 50% of the voting power; or (iii) has the power,
based on contacts, constituent documents or other means, to direct the man-
agement and policies of the enterprise .... ." Id. at 1.
81. Id. at 15.
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ALJ's decision, based on the single event transaction cases cited
by the ALJ, but it should be expected that the Board will take a
hard look at whether that precedent should be applied in the
context of a neutrality agreement. For instance, the single event
transaction cases cited by the ALJ in Heartland generally involve a
successorship clause which seeks to preserve a collective bargain-
ing agreement currently in effect for an established bargaining
unit, so that those employees do not lose work or suffer a reduc-
tion in wages, benefits, or other working conditions as a result of
a sale of the business. A neutrality agreement, by contrast, does
not so directly preserve the interests of an existing bargaining
unit. The objective of a neutrality agreement is to regulate the
process of establishing a new bargaining unit at a different busi-
ness or facility-albeit one that is affiliated with the existing busi-
ness. Thus, the same work preservation objective that is present
in a traditional successorship clause is not necessarily present in a
neutrality agreement.82 Indeed, the ALJ in Heartland found no
work preservation rationale for the neutrality agreement in that
case because "Heartland itself does not directly employ any work-
ers whose work would be adversely affected by the acquisitions."83
The ALJ's reliance on the right of control by Heartland over
affiliated business entities appears misplaced, however. In the
absence of a work preservation objective, Heartland's ostensible
control over the operations of an affiliated business entity is not
sufficient to avoid a violation of Section 8(e). The Board in Man-
ganaro Corporation4 found that an anti-double breasting clause
did not violate Section 8(e) because it passed both prongs of the
two-part test established by the Supreme Court in the ILA cases:
the clause had a lawful work preservation objective and the con-
tracting employer had the "right of control" over the work in
question.8 5 The Heartland agreement, however, has no work
preservation objective, as the ALJ found.86 Therefore, any "right
of control" Heartland may have with respect to affiliated business
entities is irrelevant. The only relevant inquiry is whether Heart-
82. As the D.C. Circuit held in Pall Corp. v. NLRB, "prescribing the man-
ner of recognition at a new facility is not a 'direct frontal attack' upon the prob-
lem of transfer of work facing employees at already organized facilities." 275
F.3d 116, 122 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The court also pointed out that "even expe-
dited recognition is only the first step toward equalizing labor costs and thereby
preventing the transfer of work." Id.
83. Heartland, JD(NY)-23-05, at 11.
84. Painters District Council 51 (Manganaro Corp.), 321 NLRB 158
(1996).
85. Id. at 164 (citing NLRB v. Longshoremen ILA, 447 U.S. 490 (1980)).
86. Heartland, JD (NY)-23-05, at 11.
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land and its affiliated business entities are a "single employer"
under the Act. 7
CONCLUSION
The issues currently before the Board, while they are distinct
legal issues, have many common themes and therefore cry out
for a coherent solution. Whichever way the Board ultimately
decides these issues, the Board should articulate a unifying the-
ory which makes the result in each case consistent with the next.
Ultimately, the Board must decide what role neutrality agree-
ments will play in modern labor law, and conversely what role the
Board will reserve for itself as unions seek alternative methods
for reversing their steady decline in membership in the private
sector. For many years, employers and unions have been strug-
gling with these issues at the bargaining table, and through the
various forms of leverage each side may exert in the economic
and public relations arenas. The opportunity has finally arrived
for the Board to answer difficult questions that are reflective of a
sea change in modern labor relations-a sea change that has
occurred largely outside the Board's administrative framework.
The Board's task now is to answer these questions in a manner
that effectuates the dual purposes of the Act: protecting
employee free choice in selecting their collective bargaining rep-
resentative (or in refraining from doing so) and preserving
industrial peace. Reconciling these dual purposes is not an easy
task, particularly in the context of an issue as contentious as neu-
trality and card check agreements, but it is nonetheless the
important task now before the Board.
87. See Manganaro, 321 NLRB at 158, n.5 (Member Cohen, dissenting);
Carpenters Dist. Council of Ne. Ohio (Alessio Construction), 310 NLRB 1023,
1025-26 (1993). Even then, a single employer inquiry may be unnecessary if
the Heartland agreement violates Section 8(e) on its face. See Carpenters (Nov-
inger's, Inc.), 337 NLRB 1030, 1030 (2002), enj'd, 352 F.3d 831 (3d Cir. 2003).
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